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Corporate patents are perceived to be the key profit-drivers in many multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). Moreover, as the transfer pricing process for royalty payments is often highly 
intransparent, they also constitute a major source of profit shifting opportunities between 
multinational entities. For both reasons, MNEs have an incentive to locate their patents at 
affiliates with a relatively small corporate tax rate. Our paper empirically tests for this 
relationship by exploiting a unique dataset which links information on patent applications to 
micro panel data for European MNEs. Our results suggest that the corporate tax rate 
(differential to other group members) indeed exerts a negative effect on the number of patents 
filed by a subsidiary. The effect is quantitatively large and robust against controlling for 
affiliate size. The findings prevail if we additionally account for royalty withholding taxes. 
Moreover, binding ‘Controlled Foreign Company’ rules tend to decrease the number of patent 
applications. 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that multinational companies strategically locate owner-
ship of their intellectual property at tax-havens, with the intention of minimizing their
corporate tax burden. For example, the Wall Street Journal reports that Microsoft,
a company which earns three-fourths of its revenue from license fees, is \increasingly
setting up units in Ireland that route intellectual property and its nancial fruits to
the low-tax haven" (Wall Street Journal, 2005). In the UK, the Guardian writes that
\three FTSE 100 companies have quietly transferred their valuable intellectual prop-
erty to low-tax locations", meaning that \they can reduce their UK-based prots and
hence their British tax bills" (The Guardian, 2009).
The rationale behind locating intellectual property at low-tax aliates is two-fold.
First, intangible assets are increasingly perceived to be important value-drivers within
multinational enterprises (MNEs) (e.g. see Hall, 2001, Zingales, 2000). Locating them
at low-tax aliates is thus an attractive tax saving strategy as it implies that the
intangibles' prots become taxable at a low corporate tax rate. Second, the common
good nature of intellectual property involves that it is used as an input factor by several
operating aliates within the multinational group which then pay a royalty or license
fee to the intangibles-owner (see e.g. Markusen, 1995). As arm's length-prices for these
rm-specic royalty payments are commonly not available to tax authorities, MNEs
can distort royalty prices in order to shift prot between the operating entities and the
intangibles-owner. Consequently, it pays for the MNE to locate its intellectual property
at a low-tax country as this establishes a prot shifting link between all operating
aliates and a tax-haven subsidiary (see also Dischinger and Riedel, 2008).1
Tax authorities have raised increasing concerns about the relocation of intangible
assets to low-tax economies as they fear that the mitigation of intellectual property
deteriorates their country's corporate tax base (see e.g. Hejazi, 2006). Nevertheless,
studies which go beyond anecdotal evidence and investigate the link between corporate
taxation and the location of intellectual property in a systematic empirical framework
are scarce as information on intellectual property ownership is commonly not available
in standard rm data sets.
In the following, we will investigate this relationship by exploiting a new and unique
1In the contrary, if the intangible asset is located at a high-tax subsidiary, the MNE obtains shifting
possibilities solely between the tax haven and the intangibles-holding rm whereas other high-tax
aliates remain without shifting link to a low-tax country.
2data source that connects accounting and ownership information for a large panel of
European multinational subsidiaries to data on patent applications provided by the
European Patent Oce (EPO). Thus, our analysis focuses on the location of corporate
patents as a particular form of intangible property. The data is available for the years
1995 to 2003. To identify the impact of corporate taxes on multinational patent loca-
tion, we additionally merge information on various aspects of the corporate taxation
system. Following our argumentation above, we account for the host country's corpo-
rate tax burden (as measured by the statutory corporate tax rate) and the relative
attractiveness of a subsidiary's corporate taxation scheme compared to other rms in
the multinational group (as measured by the corporate tax rate dierential between
the entities). Moreover, our analysis takes into account that the eective tax burden on
royalty income may be aected by withholding taxes on royalty payments and so-called
Controlled Foreign Company (CFC) rules which are implemented at the subsidiary's
parent location and attempt to refrain MNEs from avoiding taxes in their residence
country by making passive (patent) income earned at low-tax subsidiaries taxable at
the parent location.
We assess the link between corporate taxation and the number of patent applications
in various empirical specications. Our most preferred model is a negative binomial
framework which controls for aliate xed eects. The results suggest that both, the
corporate tax rate and the tax rate dierential to other group aliates, exert a nega-
tive impact on the subsidiary's number of patent applications whereas the eects are
robust against the inclusion of time-varying country characteristics and aliate size
controls. Quantitatively, the coecient estimates are sizable, implying semi-elasticities
of  2:3 and larger. Thus, the regressions indeed suggest that MNEs distort the location
of patents in favor of aliates with relatively low corporate tax rates. Moreover, we
nd that the negative eect of taxes on the number of patent applications prevails if
we construct tax measures that additionally account for withholding taxes on royalty
income. Last, our regressions indicate that CFC regulations are eective in refrain-
ing MNEs from locating patents at low-tax locations since binding CFC rules tend to
reduce the number of patent applications led by a corporate subsidiary.
Our study contributes to the literature on multinational income shifting. A growing
number of papers has provided empirical evidence which suggests that MNEs transfer
prots from high-tax to low-tax aliates in order to diminish their corporate tax burden
(see e.g. Devereux, 2007; Huizinga and Laeven, 2008). Recent work has connected these
multinational prot shifting activities to the ownership of intellectual property.2 The
2Several studies suggest a strong general link between intangible property ownership and the emer-
3idea is that arm's length prices for intra-rm royalties charged for the use of rm-specic
intangible assets are hardly observable to tax authorities and that multinationals can
thus easily distort the associated transfer prices and shift prots to low-tax countries.
This notion is conrmed by a set of empirical papers which show that prot shifting
activities are larger in MNEs with high intellectual property holdings and high R&D
intensities (see e.g. Grubert, 2003).
However, in contrast to our work, these papers neglect that corporate taxation may
distort the location of intangible assets itself as MNEs have an incentive to ensure that
their patent returns are taxable at a low rate and that prot shifting channels to low-
tax countries are available to operating aliates world wide. In this sense, our analysis
is most closely related to two recent papers: Mutti and Grubert (2008) provide evidence
that US MNEs structure their operation in such a way that royalty income accrues with
foreign subsidiaries in low-tax countries. However, as they do not observe information
on patent ownership or license agreements, their evidence is indirect. Dischinger and
Riedel (2008) nd that the corporate tax rate exerts a negative eect on the size
of intangible property assets, as reported on company balance sheets. However, using
balance sheet data has limitations as it does, for example, not allow for a disaggregation
of the legal assets which constitute the reported intangible asset gure whereas our
study focuses on a clearly identied form of intellectual property.
Moreover, our paper is related to a small literature that investigates how the tax
system aects the location of R&D activity within multinational companies. For the
US, Hall (1993) and Hines (1994) study the responsiveness of corporate R&D to the
Research and Experimentation Tax Credit and nd signicant R&D price elasticities.
Similarly, Jae and Hines (2001) determine how US R&D expense deduction rules aect
the location of R&D by US multinationals.3 Bloom et al. (2002) conrm a signicantly
positive eect of R&D tax credits on the level of R&D expenditures using macro data
gence of multinational rms as with intellectual property holdings the threat of knowledge dissipation
tends to favor market entry through foreign direct investment over other entry modes like licensing
agreements with third parties (see e.g. Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Saggi 1996, 1999; Fosfuri, 2000;
Markusen, 2001; Gattai and Molteni, 2007).
3The study of Jae and Hines (2001) is also related to ours in the sense that they use a data set
which is the US equivalent to our data as it equally combines rm information and data on patent
applications. One important dierence though is that Jae and Hines (2001) are interested in the
location of R&D rather than in the location of the corporate patents. Thus, they exploit the patent
oce data with respect to the information on the location of the patent inventor while we in contrast
use the information on the location of the patent applicant. Note that inventor and applicant location
dier for a substantial fraction of the patents in our data set, being well above 10%.
4for major OECD countries. However, all of the cited papers focus on the role of R&D
tax credits and abstract from potential eects of the corporate tax system on the
location of the legally protected output to R&D activities, i.e. the corporate patents.
Our study lls this gap and assesses the impact of corporate taxation on the choice of
patent location accounting for various tax incentives, including the statutory corporate
tax rate, withholding taxes and CFC legislations.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical considerations.
Sections 3 and 4 describe the data set and the estimation methodology. In Section 5,
we show the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 Theoretical Considerations
This section explores how the international corporate tax system may aect patent
ownership within multinational rms. The following discussion leads on to Section 3,
where we construct the tax variables used in our empirical analysis.
The value of a patent stems from its provision of a temporary monopolistic right
to exploit the associated technology within a given geographic area. Any party that
wishes to use the technology in that geographic area will have to pay a royalty fee to
the patent owner. To avoid knowledge dissipation, MNEs have a tendency to sell the
right to exploit a patented technology to aliated companies only (see Introduction)
whereas the latter are forced, by the transfer price system, to pay a royalty to the
patent owner. While in many cases the inventor of the technology is also the owner of
the associated patent, our data suggests that the location of R&D activities and the
resulting patents can also be geographically separated within multinational groups, as
the locations are split in a non-negligible number of cases.4
The MNE's decision where within the group to locate its corporate patents is ex-
pected to be inuenced by a set of tax considerations. First, patents belong to the
value-drivers in multinational rms (see e.g. Hall, 2000, 2007; Hall et al., 2005) and as
their income becomes part of the owner's corporate tax base, the MNE has an incen-
4According to practitioners a geographical separation of the R&D and patent location is easy to
implement. First, tax authorities can hardly track the link between R&D activities and patent location,
especially if several multinational aliates participated in the development of a patent. Second, R&D
and patent location can be split by ocially assigning the project risk to a dierent aliate than the
one hosting the R&D activity. The risk-bearing unit in charge for the project then pays a xed fee
comprising the development costs and a xed margin to the R&D department while it receives the
resulting patents and the associated patent returns.
5tive to locate the patent in a country with a small corporation tax. This incentive is
especially strong as patented knowledge (like other intellectual property) has a trade
price of zero and the location of patents and output production can henceforth be
geographically separated at low costs.5
Second, not only the host country's corporate tax burden may be decisive for the
location of multinational patents but also the aliate's relative attractiveness as a
patent location, in comparison to other rms within the same multinational group.
We thus construct a tax variable which calculates the tax rate dierence between the
considered aliate and other rms within the MNE. This variable is also expected to
capture prot shifting incentives since locating a patent in a country with a low-tax
rate and then selling the right to use this patent from there to high-tax aliates in the
same group, opens up prot shifting opportunities between the high-tax locations and
the patent-holding subsidiary in the low-tax economy.6
Third, if royalty income is paid across a national border, the country of the royalty
paying party usually charges a royalty withholding tax on the income stream. To avoid
international double taxation, royalty receiving countries apply a tax credit for the
withholding taxes already paid before assessing the income stream at their corporate
tax rate. Consequently, the eective tax burden on international royalty payments is
determined by the size of the corporate income tax at the royalty-receiving country in
relation to the size of the withholding tax imposed by the royalty-paying country. If the
receiving country's corporate tax rate is higher than the withholding tax paid at source,
a full credit will be provided for the tax already paid, meaning that the royalty income
is eectively taxed at the statutory tax rate of the royalty-receiving economy. In this
5Note in this context that some countries have introduced special low tax rates on royalty income
in their legislation. Since the introduction of these special rates are very recent, they fall outside of
our sample period of 1995-2003, and we do not take them into consideration in our empirical analysis.
Precisely, special low royalty income tax rates were recently introduced in Hungary, Luxembourg and
the Netherlands. Ireland in turn has exempted royalty income from taxation since 1973. However, until
2008 this exemption was granted only if the MNE equally undertook the R&D in Ireland. As patent
relocation schemes often imply a geographical separation of R&D and patent ownership, we use the
Irish standard corporate tax rate in our empirical analysis but in robustness checks reran the analysis
using a zero income tax rate for Ireland which turns out to leave the qualitative and quantitative
results unaected.
6Note that locating the patent at one of the high-tax aliates is less attractive as it implies that
the MNE gains only one prot shifting link between the high-tax intangibles-owner and a low-tax
country while other operating aliates in high-tax economies remain without a shifting link (see also
Dischinger and Riedel, 2008).
6scenario the withholding tax rate does not aect the corporate after-tax income and
consequently the patent location decision. However, if the royalty-receiving country's
corporate tax rate falls short from the withholding tax paid at source, the tax rebate
is restricted to the corporate income tax due. In this scenario, the royalty income is
eectively taxed at the withholding rate which generates incentives for the MNE to
locate patents in countries that have favorable bilateral tax treaties and thus ensure
low withholding taxes on the royalty income stream.
Last, our analysis accounts for so-called `Controlled Foreign Company' (CFC) rules
which intend to prevent companies from avoiding taxes in their residence country by
diverting income to subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions. CFC rules operate by imposing
an immediate tax charge at the level of the parent company on income earned in a
foreign subsidiary if a set of criteria is fullled. The criteria vary across countries but
in essence include an ownership threshold (e.g. the parent must hold more than 10% of
the equity in the subsidiary), a tax threshold (e.g. the foreign tax paid on the subsidiary
income must be less than 60% of the tax that would have been paid had the income
been generated at the parent's location), and a threshold which species that a certain
proportion of the subsidiary's income must arise from `passive' or `tainted' sources (e.g.
a fraction greater than 5%). In most national CFC laws, royalties are considered to
be passive income. If the CFC criteria for a given subsidiary are satised, the passive
income of that subsidiary eectively becomes taxed at the corporate rate at the parent
location, even if the income is not repatriated. We thus hypothesize that subsidiaries
that are subject to CFC rules are less likely to own patents.
Summarizing, this section suggests that MNEs have an incentive to locate their
corporate patents at aliates which observe a low corporate tax burden relative to
other group members and do not face binding CFC legislations. From a practical point
of view, MNEs can exploit dierent organizational structures to achieve a (re)location of
patents to low-tax economies. First, they may obviously shift whole R&D units to low-
tax aliates. As this, however, may involve considerable costs, practitionners claim that
a more often applied structure is to engage in subcontracting agreements in which the
R&D head oce is located in a low-tax country and subcontracts research to operating
R&D units at other aliates. The latter earn a xed margin on their costs while the
head oce bears the project risk, receives the associated patent rights and earns all
residual prots. Apart from subcontracting agreements, aliates may moreover also
engage in cost-sharing arrangements in which several aliates share the costs and
benets of developing a (later patented) technology. If appropriately structured, these
cost sharing agreements allow MNEs to assign an overproportional amount of prots to
7low-tax aliates. In the following, we will empirically test whether and to what extent
multinationals engage in these relocation activities. The next section will describe our
dataset and the construction of the tax variables used in our empirical analysis.
3 Data description
Our analysis is based on a unique dataset which links patent applications to rm-level
accounting and ownership data. The dataset has been generated by a match of patent
applications from the European Patent Oce (EPO) to the European rm data base
AMADEUS, in a research eort undertaken by the Institute for Fiscal Studies (see
Abramovsky et al. (2008) for details).
The patents data comes from the EPO's Worldwide Patent Statistical Database
(PATSTAT) which contains information on all patent applications to the EPO dating
back to 1978, including (among others) information on the name of the patent applicant
and the application date. The data version used in this paper is October 2007 and
comprises up to 100,000 patent applications per year. Firms seeking patent protection in
a number of European states may le an application directly at the EPO and designate
the relevant national oces (among those covered by the EPO) in which protection is
sought.7 Filing a patent with the EPO rstly enables a rm to make a single application
which is cheaper than ling separately in each national oce and secondly allows it to
delay the decision over which national states to further the application in. Thus, it is
especially attractive to le the valuable patents with the EPO which a rm intends to
exploit in several European markets.
The data on patent applications is merged to European company accounts informa-
tion collected by Bureau van Dijk in the AMADEUS database.8 The company data
is available in panel format for the years 1995 to 2003 and thus, we also restrict the
merged data to the years 1995 to 2003.9 One advantage of the AMADEUS data is that
7The EPO is not a body of the European Union and as a result the states which form part
of the European Patent Convention (the legal basis for the EPO) are distinct from those in the
European Union. See: http://www.epo.org/about-us/epo/member-states.html. Note moreover that
our data does not capture patent relocations after the application process. However, as outright sales
of intangible assets are scarce in practice, we consider our analysis to capture the most important
strategies to transfer patent ownership to low-tax economies (see e.g. OECD, 2009).
8Precisely, the IFS applies a standard name matching procedure to link the two data sets. For
detailed information see Abramovsky et al. (2008).
9As the PATSTAT data on patent applications is available for a longer time span, we nevertheless
8it covers a large number of rms across many countries and includes both, accounting
and ownership information. We capture subsidiaries that are ultimately owned by a
parent rm whereas ultimate ownership implies that the parent is an independent com-
pany (i.e. no single rm owns more than 24.99% of the shares) and holds a recorded
share of over 24.99% in the subsidiary (whereas the ownership shares are commonly
considerably higher, being close to a 100% in the majority of cases). The parent is the
highest rm in the ownership chain for which the above conditions hold. Note, however,
that one drawback of the AMADEUS database is that it records ownership at a single
point in time which is the year 2004 in our sample. In line with previous papers, we are
however not too concerned about this issue as misclassications of parent-subsidiary
connections introduce noise into our analysis (where group information is exploited in
the regressions) and tend to bias our results against zero. Thus, the associated coe-
cient estimates have to be interpreted as a lower bound to the true eect.
The matched data comprises patent applications led by rms from 18 European
countries: Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
Switzerland, United Kingdom. The match rates for the data sets are satisfactory with
a proportion of 50% to 70% of patent owning rms in PATSTAT being matched to
AMADEUS in the large European countries. For some East-European countries match
rates can be smaller, as low as 25%, which is driven by a small coverage of AMADEUS
in those countries and a low matching eort of the IFS (see Abramovsky et al. 2008).
In terms of the number of patents matched per country, success rates are even higher
ranging between 80% and 99% which reects that large companies owning a lot of
patents are well represented in AMADEUS.
Since our analysis centers around tax eects on the location of patents within MNEs,
we restrict the dataset to subsidiaries belonging to multinational groups. For a multi-
national subsidiary to be included in the data, it had to apply for a patent at least
once within our sample period and thus we restrict our analysis to rms which in gen-
eral qualify as patent holding subsidiaries. As the coverage of multinational rms in
AMADEUS is much better than the coverage of national rms, we are condent that
our dataset includes all important patent holding subsidiaries in Europe.
From this data, we determine the annual number of patent applications led by a
corporate subsidiary and hence, the observational unit in our analysis is the multina-
reran our regressions without rm data controls for the whole time period covered in PATSTAT and
found comparable results to the ones reported in this paper.
9tional aliate per year. In total, our sample comprises 85;330 observations for 11;828
multinational subsidiaries. Country statistics for our sample are presented in Table 1.
The pattern of multinational subsidiaries and their parent countries broadly resembles
the pattern of multinational rms in Europe with the largest fraction of rms in France,
Germany and the United Kingdom.10 The very high number of UK subsidiaries partly
reects a high matching eort of the IFS for that country. Switzerland and Netherlands
host a high number of patent owning subsidiaries, which may partly reect the favor-
able tax treatment of royalty income in these countries. Note, moreover, that while our
subsidiary sample is restricted to European countries, parent rms (i.e. global ultimate
owners) may equally be located in a country outside the EU. As depicted in Table 1,
most of the non-European parent rms reside in the US and Japan.
Moreover, basic descriptive statistics for the data are presented in Table 2. On av-
erage, a subsidiary applies for 0:7 patents per year whereas the patent count varies
between a minimum of 0 patents and a maximum of 20 patents.11 Moreover, we con-
struct a binary variable which takes on the value 1 if the subsidiary applies for a positive
number of patents in a considered year and 0 otherwise; 28% of the subsidiary-year
combinations exhibit a positive number of patent applications.
To determine the eect of corporate tax legislation on the multinational choice of
patent location, we add information on the corporate tax systems of each country. First,
we add the statutory tax rate applicable in a subsidiary's host country (obtained from
EUROSTAT). Second, we capture the relative attractiveness of an aliate as a patent
location by calculating the tax measure tdit, which captures the tax rate dierence
between subsidiary i's statutory tax rate at time t and the statutory tax rate of all
other aliates within the corporate group, including the parent rm. To do so, we have
to restrict our analysis to subsidiaries for which AMADEUS contains information on






(tit   tjt); i 6= j (1)
10Note that Table 1 depicts the subsidiary and parent countries for the aliates in our sample and
thus, the sum of both columns adds up to the total number of subsidiaries in our sample.
11To avoid that our results are driven by outliers, we deleted a set of companies with very large
patent application numbers from our analysis which is however not decisive for our qualitative results.
12Precisely, this implies that information on the subsidiary's ultimate owner must be available with
AMADEUS as well as a full list of the aliates owned by this ultimate owner. Note that, although
AMADEUS does provide accounting information for aliates within Europe only, the ownership
information is available on a worldwide basis, i.e. includes subsidiaries outside European borders.
10whereas j indicates all foreign aliates in the same multinational group as subsidiary
i and N depicts the overall number of foreign aliates. Note, that equation (1) implies
the calculation of an unweighted average which we consider to be appropriate in our
context as size information (e.g. on the aliates' total asset investment) is available
only for a subset of multinational subsidiaries and we would thus loose a non-negligible
number of subsidiaries when calculating a size-weighted average. However, in robustness
checks we experimented with a size-weighted average tax dierence measures and did
not nd our qualitative results to change. Moreover, in the calculation of tdi we account
for foreign aliates which are either the subsidiary's parent rm or owned by the group
with 100% of the ownership rights only. The rationale behind this is that we consider
partially owned subsidiaries to be less likely to hold corporate patents and also to be less
likely to be integrated in the MNE's prot shifting activities (see e.g. Weichenrieder,
2009). Nevertheless, again we ran robustness checks which additionally account for
partially owned subsidiaries in the calculation of tdit and did not nd our empirical
results to be sensitive with respect to this modication.
As shown in Table 2a, both the statutory tax rate as well as the constructed tax
dierence measure tdit exhibit considerable variation across our sample observations.
The average statutory tax rate is 37.7% and it varies between 10% and 59% for the rms
in our sample. The average tax dierence is 0% and exhibits a wide spread between
-30.5% and 37.5%.
Third, we add information on withholding rates which apply on royalties payments
to a subsidiary in our sample. Royalty withholding rates are specied in bilateral tax
treaties. If a bilateral tax treaty does not exist, countries usually impose a unilateral rate
which holds for royalty payments to all non-treaty countries. Since the unilateral rates
are generally higher than the treaty rates, countries with a favorable treaty network are
expected to be attractive patent locations. We retrieve information on the unilateral
royalty withholding rates as well as information on treaty withholding rates from the
Ernest & Young corporate tax guides 1995-2003.
This information allows us to calculate a tax measure teit which captures the ef-
fective tax burden on royalty income earned by patents held at a given multinational
subsidiary. As described in Section 2, this eective tax rate on royalty income is cal-
culated as the maximum of the statutory tax rate applicable at the income-receiving
subsidiary and the withholding tax rate applicable on the royalty income stream. To
calculate this eective tax burden in our data set, we have to make an assumption about
the nature of the royalty streams earned by a patent-holding subsidiary in our sample.
As patents are widely acknowledged to be common goods within a multinational rm
11which are employed as input factor by several operating aliates (see Markusen, 1995),
we will assume that a patent-holding subsidiary receives royalty income from all other
aliates within its multinational group, including the parent.13 Therefore, to calculate
the eective tax rate for a considered subsidiary, we determine the maximum of the
subsidiary's statutory tax rate and the withholding tax rate applicable if royalties are
paid from a foreign aliate to the considered subsidiary and take the unweighted av-
erage of these measures. Again, we account for wholly owned aliates only. Formally,






max(tit;whti;j;t); i 6= j (2)
whereas whti;j;t depicts the withholding tax rate applicable on royalty income paid by
the foreign aliate j to the considered subsidiary i. Again, we determine an unweighted
average of the royalty withholding rates and restrict the calculation in (2) to foreign
aliates which are either the considered subsidiary's parent or are wholly owned by
the multinational group. In robustness checks, we relaxed these assumptions and did
not nd our qualitative results to be aected.
Table 2b exhibits the withholding tax rates on royalty income applicable in 2003
between EU countries, the US and Japan. The table indicates that withholding tax
rates are usually low, being zero in many cases. High rates mostly apply for roy-
alty payments involving Eastern and Southern European member states, the US and
Japan.14 Moreover, the multinational groups in our sample comprise several non-EU
subsidiaries whose host countries do not have tax treaties with the European economies
in our sample and thus charge unilateral withholding rates which are well above 20%.
As presented in the sample statistics in Table 2a, the average withholding tax rates
charged on royalty streams from foreign group members to our sample subsidiaries
vary between 0% and 30%, but the average rate is only 1.1%. Thus it is not surprising
to nd that the calculation of the eective tax rate teit is largely dominated by the
statutory tax measure as the withholding tax is usually lower than the host country's
corporate tax. The average rate is 35.5% and varies between a minimum of 10% and a
maximum rate of 59%.15
13Thus, we implicitly assume that patent(s) held at the considered subsidiary are used by all other
aliates within the group and that royalties are paid for the use of this patent.
14Note, that after our sample period in 2004 the EU Interest and Royalty Directive took eect which
abolished withholding tax rates between countries in the European Union.
15Note that the average eective tax rate calculated for our sample is slightly smaller than the
12Last, we construct a CFC dummy variable which indicates whether CFC legislations
are binding for a subsidiary in a given year. The information on CFC legislations is
collected from Sandler (1998), Lang et al. (2004) and the International Bureau of Fiscal
Documentation (IBFD).16 As described in the previous section, for CFC rules to be
binding, they have to be implemented in the subsidiary's parent country and three
additional criteria have to be fullled: First, the parent rm has to hold a suciently
large ownership share in the subsidiary. Second, the income derived in the subsidiary
has to be mainly passive in nature. Third, the subsidiary's host economy has to be
classied as a tax haven by its parent country.
Since the subsidiaries in our sample are ultimately owned by their parent rms and
the ownership thresholds in CFC legislations are usually low (at 10%), the ownership
criterion is fullled for all aliates in our sample. Moreover, royalty income earned on
patents is one potential source of passive income in a subsidiary since it often does
not relate to other active parts of the business, and hence we equally assume the
passive income criterion is fullled. Consequently, the construction of our CFC dummy
variable will focus on the tax haven criteria which are summarized in Table 2c for the
most important parent countries in our sample. As depicted in the table, the tax haven
criteria are fullled if the subsidiary's host country is on a black list at the parent
location or exhibits a corporate tax rate that falls short of a dened threshold. Since
many of the subsidiaries in our sample are located in European high-tax countries,
CFC rules do not apply in their context. Thus, it is not surprising that the fraction
of observations in our sample for which CFC rules are binding is only 6.4%. As shown
in Table 2d, CFC legislations are most likely to apply if the parent rm resides in the
US, Canada and Germany. In turn, the subsidiaries for which CFC rules are likely
to be binding tend to be located in countries with low tax rates, such as Ireland and
Switzerland (in which 43% and 20% of the sample subsidiaries face binding CFC rules,
see the last column of Table 2c).
Note, however, that our constructed measure for a binding CFC rule is only a proxy.
average statutory tax rate. Theoretically, the statutory tax rate measure should be a lower bound
for the eective tax rate measure which is the maximum of the statutory and the withholding rate
on royalty income. However, the eective tax rate measure can only be calculated for the subset of
our sample aliates for which ownership information on the multinational group is available, which
overproportionally tends to be the case for sample subsidiaries with a low corporate tax rate and
henceforth also a low eective tax rate measure.
16We collected information on CFC legislations for all major parent countries in our sample (i.e.
EU25, the US, Canada, Japan and Korea). As a small number of rms in our sample observe parents
located in other countries, the CFC legislation is missing for a small fraction of the observations.
13One issue may for example be that there is a considerable number of US owned Euro-
pean subsidiaries in our sample which we classify as being subject to CFC treatment.
But in practice US multinationals may opt out of CFC treatment under so-called \check
the box" rules. Since we cannot track which of the European subsidiaries of US parents
have been elected to \check the box" treatment, we assume they are all subject to the
usual CFC treatment. As this might not hold for all cases, we introduce noise to our es-
timation which is expected to bias our coecient estimates towards zero. Henceforth, if
we nd signicant eects of CFC rules on patent ownership, they should be interpreted
as the lower bound to the true impact.
Moreover, Table 2a reports summary statistics for the size of the rms included in our
sample. The size measures vary strongly across the companies in our sample with an
average employment number of 1;408 but a relatively large standard deviation from the
mean. The same applies for the xed asset variable. Additionally, we add information
on time-varying country characteristics which we presume to inuence the location of
corporate patents, precisely the number of scientic researchers per million of country
inhabitants and the gross domestic product (GDP) (both obtained from the World
Development Indicator database). The average subsidiary in our sample is located in
a country with a GDP of 1:4 trillions US dollars and 2;918 scientic researchers per
million of country inhabitants.
4 Estimation Methodology
The aim of our analysis is to determine if and to what extent corporate taxation impacts
on the location of patents within a multinational group. The analysis focuses on the
tax determinants of the number of patent applications by a multinational subsidiary i
in year t. Precisely, we estimate a model of the following form
yit = 1Tit + 2Xit + i + t + i;t (3)
whereas yi;t depicts subsidiary i's number of patent applications at time t which is
regressed on a vector of corporate tax parameters Ti;t comprising the variables con-
structed in the previous Sections 2 and 3: the host country's statutory tax rate tit, the
tax rate dierence between the considered aliate and other group members tdit, an
eective tax rate on royalty income which takes into account the corporate tax rate
and the withholding rates on royalty income teit and last, a dummy variable CFCit
which indicates whether CFC rules apply. We expect all these variables to decrease
14the number of patents held by a subsidiary and hence the estimated coecients on the
regressors are expected to be negative (1 < 0).
Moreover, we include a set of control variables into our analysis which is depicted by
the vector Xit. First, we account for aliate size to ensure that the coecient estimates
for 1 do not only reect the well-known negative eect of corporate taxes on rm size.
Precisely, we include the number of employees as a size control whereas sensitivity
checks show that the results are robust against the use of other size variables like xed
asset investment. Moreover, we account for the country's attractiveness as an R&D
location and its market size by including control variables for the number of scientic
researchers per inhabitants and the country's GDP.17 However, the attractiveness of a
subsidiary as a patent location is also likely to be determined by aliate specic factors
which are unobservable to the econometrician. This suggests to include a set of aliate
xed eects i to capture time-constant rm dierences which is also conrmed by a
Hausman test. Last, we include a full set of year xed eects t to control for shocks
over time that are common to all subsidiaries and (in robustness checks) add a full set
of 2-digit industry-year dummies to account for industry-specic shocks over time.
In the rst set of regressions, we estimate equation (3) in a simple OLS framework
with rm xed eects. The OLS approach however does not account for the fact that
the patent variable is restricted to positive values. We thus in a second step reestimate
equation (3) in models which account for censored data.18 In the following, we will
present the results of a random eects tobit framework. Note that the estimation of
a xed eect tobit model is not feasible as a sucient statistic that allows the xed
eect to be conditioned out of the likelihood does not exist. We however allow for
a correlation between the subsidiary specic eects and the explanatory variables in
the random eects specications following Mundlak (1978) and Chamberlain (1984)
by explicitly modelling this correlation and assuming a particular parameterization of
the rm specic eect as a function of the explanatory variables. Precisely, we adapt
an often made choice in this context and model the aliate xed eect as a linear
combination of the explanatory variables' averages over time.
Nevertheless, our most preferred model is a negative binomial framework as it does
consider the count nature of our data and the skewed distribution in the number of
17In robustness checks, we moreover experimented with including additional country characteristics
and did not nd our results to be aected (see Section 5).
18Note that the number of patent counts may become negative if multinationals, for example,
withdraw patent applications or le a technology developed at a considered subsidiary with another
aliate. As these cases are reported as zero counts, our data may be considered as censored.
15patent counts. The negative binomial specications are thereby chosen since a likelihood
ratio test indicates overdispersion of our data and suggests that the model cannot be
collapsed to a poisson specication (although poisson estimations derive qualitatively
comparable results). Precisely, we follow Hausman et al. (1984) and estimate a negative
binomial regression model which accounts for rm specic eects.
5 Results
Our results are presented in Tables 3 to 6. All regressions account for subsidiary and
year xed eects. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors which control for clustering
at the rm level are depicted in parentheses below the coecient estimates.
Table 3 presents regressions of the number of patent applications on the host coun-
try's corporate tax rate. Specications (1) to (3) depict OLS estimates with subsidiary
xed eects. In line with the intuition described in Section 2, we nd that the corporate
tax rate exerts a signicantly negative impact on the subsidiaries' number of patent
applications. This eect turns out to be robust against the inclusion of time-varying
country controls in Specication (2) and a size control in Specication (3). Evaluated
at the sample mean, Specication (3) suggests that an increase in the corporate tax
rate by 1 percentage point reduces the number of patent applications by 2.8%.
Specications (4) to (6) moreover account for the restriction of the patent variable to
positive values and reestimate the link between corporate taxes and patent applications
in a random eects tobit model which includes time-averages of the regressors to control
for time-invariant subsidiary characteristics. The results conrm our previous ndings
and indicate a negative eect of corporate taxes on the number of patent applications
which is robust against the inclusion of time-varying country characteristics and a size
control in Specications (5) and (6). The OLS eect is also quantitatively conrmed
as Specication (6) suggests that an increase in the corporate tax rate by 1 percentage
point reduces the number of patent applications by 2.9%.19
However, as mentioned in the previous section, our most preferred specication is
a negative binomial model which controls for time-constant subsidiary characteristics
19 Note that the coecient estimates in the random eects tobit model (presented in Specications
(4) to (6)) have no direct quantitative interpretation. To quantitatively interpret the results, we assume
the random eect to be zero and calculate the marginal eect for the expected value of the patent
application variable conditional on being uncensored. For the specication in Column (6), we derive a
marginal eect of  2:01. Evaluated at the sample mean, this translates into a semi-elasticity of  2:9.
16as this acknowledges the count nature of our data and the skewness in the patent
count distribution. The negative binomial framework is chosen as a likelihood ratio
test indicates overdispersion of the data and rejects the estimation of a poisson model
(the likelihood ratio chi-square statistic for the baseline specication in Column (7) is
799.65; if control variables are included in the specications, the chi-square statistic
increases further). The results are presented in Specications (7) to (9) and conrm our
previous ndings as the corporate tax rate exerts a signicant and negative impact on
the number of patent applications. Interpreting the coecient estimates quantitatively
in this xed eects framework is not straight forward (as the common assumption of a
zero xed eect implies an implausible expected patent count of zero in this model). We
thus reestimate the specications in a random eects negative binomial specication
which models xed eects by time-averages of the regressors (whereas the results are
not reported in the paper but available from the authors upon request). Evaluated at
a random eect of zero (which is noncritical in the random-eect framework, see e.g.
Winkelmann, 2008), this model derives comparable quantitative results to the ones
reported in the OLS and tobit specications.
The number of patent applications might, however, not only be dependent on the
statutory tax rate applicable in a country but may also be determined by alternative
location options within the multinational group. To account for that, we constructed an
alternative tax measure which captures the average dierence between a subsidiary's
statutory tax rate and the statutory tax rate at other group locations as described in
Section 3. Since the construction of the tax dierence measure requires information on
the ownership structure of the multinational group which is available for a subset of
rms in our sample only, the sample size drops compared to our baseline estimations.
The results are presented in Table 4 and suggest a negative impact of the corporate tax
rate dierential on the number of patent applications which is robust against dierent
model specications and the inclusion of size and time-varying country-controls. Quan-
titatively, the ndings largely resemble the results for the corporate tax rate measure
presented in the previous table. The tobit specication in Column (6) suggests that an
increase in the corporate tax rate dierential by 1 percentage point reduces the number
of patent applications by 2.3% (see also footnote 19).
So far, our analysis has only accounted for eects of statutory corporate tax rate
measures. However, as explained in the previous sections, the location of patents within
a multinational rm may equally be determined by royalty withholding taxes which
motivates the construction of an eective tax measure that takes both, the statutory
and the withholding tax rate, into account. Since the calculation of this tax measure
17requires information on the MNE's ownership structure (see Section 3), the sample
size again falls short of the baseline estimations. The results are presented in Table
5. Specications (1) to (9) indicate that the constructed eective tax measure exerts
a signicantly negative eect on the number of patent applications which prevails in
dierent model frameworks and is robust against the inclusion of size and country
controls. In quantitative terms, the results are comparable to our baseline estimations.
In Column (10), we moreover determine the eect of the statutory tax rate and the
withholding tax rate separately from each other in the negative binomial framework.
While the statutory tax rate as in previous specications has a strong and negative
impact on the number of patent applications, the withholding tax rate on royalty
income does not exert a statistically signicant eect. This reects that withholding
tax rates are usually smaller than the corporate income tax due on the royalty income
stream which triggers a full rebate for the withholding taxes paid. Taking this into
account, it is not surprising that withholding taxes do not in general exert a signicant
eect on the patent location decision.
Apart from that, we assess whether a binding CFC regulation aects the number
of patent applications. We thus reestimate the baseline specications in Table 3 and
include a dummy variable which indicates whether the patent owning subsidiary is likely
to be subject to CFC treatment in the parent country (see Section 3 on the construction
of the variable). The results are presented in Table 6. The OLS specications depicted
in Columns (1) to (3) suggest that the corporate tax rate exerts a negative eect on
the number of patent applications while the coecient estimate for the CFC legislation
dummy, however, does not gain statistical signicance. This is conrmed by estimations
of a random eects tobit model presented in Columns (4) to (6).
Nevertheless, as laid out in the previous section, our most preferred estimation model
is a negative binomial framework which accounts for subsidiary xed eects. The results
of these specications are presented in Columns (7) to (9). Interestingly, the count
data model in line with our hypothesis suggests that a binding CFC rule reduces
the number of patents located at a subsidiary (see Column (7)) whereas this eect is
also robust against the inclusion of control variables for subsidiary size and country
characteristics (see Columns (8) and (9)). Thus, taking into account the count nature
and overdispersion of our data, we nd evidence that binding CFC legislations are
eective in reducing the number of patent applications (and the associated, potentially
passive, income streams).
Finally, we ran a set of robustness checks. First, we reestimated all our specications
18controlling for a full set of 2-digit industry-year eects to absorb industry shocks over
time and nd comparable results to the ones reported in this paper. Moreover, we ex-
perimented with dierent variables to control for aliate size (e.g. subsidiary assets)
and additional country controls (e.g. a corruption index and the national unemploy-
ment rate) which leaves the results unchanged. Last, we accounted for the fact that
a large fraction of subsidiary-year combinations report zero patent applications and
additionally estimated a binary logit model which controls for subsidiary xed eects.
These specications derive qualitatively comparable results which are reported in an
earlier working paper version of this paper (Karkinsky and Riedel, 2009).
6 Conclusion and Discussion
Anecdotal evidence suggests that patents and other intangible assets play a decisive
role in prot shifting strategies of multinational enterprises. Several rms are known
to hold their patents and trademarks in tax-haven countries like Ireland and Switzer-
land, famous examples are Vodafone, Pzer and Microsoft. Although tax authorities in
various countries have raised increasing concerns about these intangibles relocations,
studies which tests for the link between corporate taxes and intangible assets in a
systematic empirical framework are scarce.
This paper exploits a new and unique data set which links company accounting
data to information on patent applications provided by the European Patent Oce in
order to investigate whether and to what extent corporate taxation aects the patent
location within multinational groups. Our results suggest that the corporate tax rate
exerts a strong negative impact on a subsidiary's number of patent applications. The
eect appears across a range of model specications and is robust against controlling
for aliate size, rm xed eects and time-varying country characteristics. Similar
ndings are reported if we account for the relative attractiveness of a subsidiary's
tax scheme by using the tax rate dierential to other group members as explanatory
variable. Moreover, the estimated eects prevail if we additionally account for the role
of withholding taxes on royalty payments.
Thus, our ndings indeed suggest that MNEs tend to distort the location of their
corporate patents in favor of low-tax aliates. As patented technologies are considered
to be drivers of future prots and a major souce of transfer pricing opportunities within
multinational groups, their relocations are likely to shift relevant volumes of prot to
low-tax economies. Consequently, governments have an incentive to compete for these
19mobile prots by reducing their corporate tax rates in order to attract multinational
patents to their jurisdiction. Recent tax policy changes in some countries suggest that
this is already taking place as Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg have
recently introduced special low tax rates on royalty income from patents.
This in turn puts pressure on high-tax economies with large R&D activities to restrict
the mitigation of patents and other intangible assets from their borders. One mean
to limit this outow is to introduce or tighten CFC legislations which make foreign
royalty income taxable at the parent location. Examples of countries which recently
introduced CFC rules are Spain and Italy. Moreover, our empirical results suggest that
CFC legislations are indeed eective in restricting patent relocations as binding CFC
clauses are reported to exert a negative impact on the number of patent applications.
Furthermore, several countries currently consider to restrict intangibles relocations via
the introduction of a second anti-avoidance instrument. In 2008, Germany as the rst
economy implemented a new legislation which aims to tax part of the future income
generated from patents and other (intangible) assets developed in Germany even after
their relocation to a foreign country (see OECD (2009) for details). Practitionners
suggest that other countries might implement similar legislations soon. In the light of
our results, these policy moves to limit the (re)location of patents and other intangible
assets to low-tax economies are highly welcome as they help to close an important prot
shifting channel and therefore to reduce international tax competition behaviour.
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23Appendix: Tables
Table 1: Country Statistics
Country Subsidiary Location Parent Location
Belgium 266 356




















United States { 1,057
Others { 213
Sum 11,828 11,828
24Table 2a: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Median Min. Max.
Number of Patents 85,330 .706 0 0 20
Dummy for Patent OwnershipN 85,330 .281 0 0 1
Statutory Tax Rate 85,330 .377 .35 0.1 .59
Tax Rate Dierence 28,939 .009 0 -.305 .375
Eective Tax Rate 27,074 .355 .31 .1 .59
Withholding Tax Rate 27,074 0.011 0 0 .3
Binding CFC Legislation 85,192 .064 0 0 1
Number of Researchers 85,330 2,915.985 2,873.071 1,014.0 7,998.24
GDPF 85,330 1,347.569 705.441 20.329 2,446.885
Number of Employees 14,322 1,066.496 277 1 92,916
Fixed Assets 13,995 174,773.6 8,924 0 7.33e+07
Notes:
N Takes on the value 1 if a subsidiary observes a positive number of patents applications in a considered year, 0
otherwise.
 Per million people
F In billion of US dollars.




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































26Table 2c: CFC Legislation in 2003
Country CFC Dummy Tax Haven Denition
Belgium 0 {
Czech Republic 0 {
Denmark 1 Eective tax < 75% of Danish Tax
Finland 1 Eective tax < 60% of Finish Tax
France 1 Eective tax < 66% of French Tax
Germany 1 Eective tax < 25%
Great Britain 1 Eective tax < 75% of British Tax
Greece 0 {
Ireland 0 {
Italy 1 Black List
Luxembourg 0 {
Netherlands 0 {
Norway 1 Eective tax < 66% of Norwegian Tax
Poland 0 {
Portugal 1 Eective tax < 60% of Portugese Tax
Spain 1 Eective tax < 75% of Spanish Tax
Sweden 1 Eective tax < 55% of Swedish Tax
Switzerland 0 {
Austria 0 {
Canada 1 Always Binding
Japan 1 Eective tax < 25%
United States 1 Eective tax < 75% of US Tax
Notes:
CFC Dummy takes on the value 1 if the parent country has a CFC legislation and the value 0 otherwise. In the case of
Norway, the 66% rule does not apply if a bilateral tax treaty exists between Norway and the country of the controlled
subsidiary, unless the majority of the income in that subsidiary is passive. We use our data on royalty withholding rates
to determine whether a bilateral tax treaty exists. In the case of Italy the black list of tax havens is quite long to be
listed here, but it is based on and is very similar to the OECD tax haven list.
27Table 2d: Binding CFC Legislation
Country Parent-Year Subsidiary-Year (in #) Subsidiary-Year (in %)
Belgium 0 8 0.34
Czech Republic 0 0 0
Denmark 12 138 3.91
Finland 16 36 3.20
France 24 326 2.69
Germany 139 48 0.20
Great Britain 56 3,725 16.61
Greece 0 0 0
Ireland 0 296 42.53
Italy 5 24 0.59
Luxembourg 0 2 3.51
Netherlands 0 335 4.45
Norway 0 34 3.83
Poland 0 5 8.93
Portugal 0 0 0
Spain 2 134 5.17
Sweden 16 154 4.62
Switzerland 0 204 20.46
Austria 0 { {
Canada 379 { {
Japan 0 { {
United States 4,832 { {
Sum 5,469 5,469 {
Notes:
The parent-year column depicts the parent countries for the subsidiary-year observations which face binding CFC rules.
The subsidiary-year column (in #) presents the country distribution for the subsidiary-year observations which face
binding CFC rules. Analogously, the last column (subsidiary-year (in %)) indicates the percentage of the subsidiary-year
observations per country which face binding CFC rules.
28Table 3: Eects of the Statutory Tax Rate
Panel 1995{2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.751 -1.130 -2.025 -4.654 -3.066 -4.885 -.677 -.939 -1.241
(.194) (.201) (1.100) (.447) (.567) (1.710) (.195) (.221) (.402)
Log # Researchers .299 .020 1.651 .822 .193 .184
(.098) (.448) (.374) (.710) (.097) (.210)
Log GDP -.752 -1.776 -2.187 -1.681 .100 .419
(.096) (.563) (.347) (.668) (.041) (.092)
Log Employees .194 .437 .094
(.048) (.096) (.026)
Year Dummies
p p p p p p p p p
Time Avg. Expl. V.
p p p
# Observations 85,330 85,330 12,033 85,330 85,330 12,033 79,768 79,768 9,841
# Firms 11,828 11,828 3,888 11,828 11,828 3,888 10,738 10,738 2,315
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for rm clusters in parentheses. , ,  indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample year. All
regressions include a full set of rm xed eects. The dependent variable is the number of patents located at
a multinational subsidiary. Statutory Tax Rate depicts the statutory tax rate applicable in the subsidiaries'
host country. Log # Researchers stands for the natural logarithm of the number of scientic researchers in a
country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product. Log Employees depicts the natural
logarithm (Log) of the rm's number of employees. FE and RE indicate xed eect and random eect speci-
cations respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that time averaged explanatory variables are included in the
estimation.
29Table 4: Eects of the Statutory Tax Rate Dierence
Panel 1995{2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Tax Rate Dierence -2.148 -1.164 -3.340 -4.821 -2.594 -4.455 -.784 -1.102 -1.939
(.553) (.564) (2.009) (1.443) (1.476) (2.458) (.337) (.355) (.762)
Log # Researchers .243 -.370 2.588 -.190 .367 -.205
(.228) (.965) (.853) (1.290) (.150) (.469)
Log GDP -1.139 -1.331 -3.185 -1.312 .115 .430
(.176) (.845) (.444) (1.048) (.064) (.117)
Log Employees .198 .441 .122
(.081) (.146) (.046)
Year Dummies
p p p p p p p p p
Time Avg. Expl. V.
p p p
# Observations 28,939 28,939 4,464 28,939 28,939 4,464 26,606 26,606 3,631
# Firms 4,177 4,177 1,482 4,177 4,177 1,482 3,695 3,695 886
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for rm clusters in parentheses. , ,  indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample year. All
regressions include a full set of rm xed eects. The dependent variable is the number of patents located at
a multinational subsidiary. Tax Rate Dierence depicts the unweighted average dierence in the statutory tax
rates between the considered subsidiary and other group members. Log # Researchers stands for the natural
logarithm of the number of scientic researchers in a country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross
domestic product. Log Employees depicts the natural logarithm (Log) of the rm's number of employees. FE
and RE indicate xed eect and random eect specications respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that
time averaged explanatory variables are included in the estimation.
30Table 5: Eects of the Eective Tax Rate
Panel 1995{2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Eective Tax Rate -2.445 -1.629 -5.479 -5.497 -4.412 -7.904 -.658 -1.138 -2.594
(.467) (.472) (2.222) (1.058) (1.068) (3.005) (.318) (.397) (.753)
Statutory Tax Rate -2.589
(.884)
Withholding Tax Rate -1.653
(8.039)
Log # Researchers .435 .367 3.092 .917 .412 -.098 -.123
(.244) (.939) (.687) (1.363) (.181) (.456) (.364)
Log GDP -.930 -.935 -1.951 -.763 .180 .561 .558
(.166) (.834) (.447) (1.176) (.056) (.135) (.116)
Log Employees .188 .418 .133 .133
(.080) (.142) (.045) (.043)
Year Dummies
p p p p p p p p p
Time Avg. Expl. V.
p p p
# Observations 27,074 27,074 4,150 27,074 27,074 4,150 24,931 24,931 3,366 3,366
# Firms 3,896 3,896 1,392 3,896 3,896 1,392 3,456 3,456 828 828
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for rm clusters in parentheses. , ,  indicates
signicance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample
year. All regressions include a full set of rm xed eects. The dependent variable is the number of patents
located at a multinational subsidiary. Eective Tax Rate stands for the eective tax on a subsidiaries'
royalty income. Statutory Tax Rate and Withholding Tax Rate depict the statutory and withholding tax
rate applicable in the subsidiaries' host country. Log # Researchers stands for the natural logarithm of
the number of scientic researchers in a country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross domestic
product. Log Employees depicts the natural logarithm (Log) of the rm's number of employees. FE and
RE indicate xed eect and random eect specications respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that
time averaged explanatory variables are included in the estimation.
31Table 6: Eects of CFC Legislations
Panel 1995{2003
Model FE OLS RE Tobit FE Negative Binomial Model
Explanat. Var.: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Statutory Tax Rate -1.751 -1.131 -1.950 -4.799 -3.134 -4.824 -.764 -1.021 -1.296
(.194) (.201) (1.102) (.443) (.574) (1.369) (.206) (.168) (.426)
CFC Legislation .038 .004 .069 -.014 -.126 -.156 -.325 -.323 -.319
(.124) (.125) (.377) (.310) (.267) (.653) (.097) (.091) (.197)
Log # Researchers .299 -.005 1.710 .767 .199 .194
(.098) (.445) (.420) (.824) (.096) (.211)
Log GDP -.751 -1.749 -2.315 -1.668 .115 .424
(.097) (.565) (.347) (.624) (.064) (.102)
Log Employees .192 .431 .092
(.048) (.076) (.026)
Year Dummies
p p p p p p p p p
Time Avg. Expl. V.
p p p
# Observations 85,192 85,192 11,990 85,192 85,192 11,990 79,642 79,642 9,802
# Firms 11,809 11,809 3,877 11,809 11,809 3,877 10,721 10,721 2,308
Notes:
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for rm clusters in parentheses. , ,  indicates signif-
icance at the 10%, 5%, 1% level. The observational units are multinational subsidiaries per sample year. All
regressions include a full set of rm xed eects. The dependent variable is the number of patents located at a
multinational subsidiary. Statutory Tax Rate depicts the statutory tax rate applicable in the subsidiaries' host
country. CFC Legislation is a dummy variable which takes on the value 1 if the aliate income is subject to
a binding CFC legislation in the parent country. Log # Researchers stands for the natural logarithm of the
number of scientic researchers in a country, Log GDP is the natural logarithm of the gross domestic product.
Log Employees depicts the natural logarithm (Log) of the rm's number of employees. FE and RE indicate xed
eect and random eect specications respectively. Time Avg. Expl. V. indicates that time averaged explanatory
variables are included in the estimation.
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